On September 8, 2011, the Great San Diego/Southwest Blackout occurred affecting approximately 5 million people. This paper explores the availability and use of social media as a crisis response tool following such a crisis event. Contrary to expectations, Internet and the cell phone system had less than the expected availability and as a result, users had a difficult time using social media to status/contact family and friends (even though they wanted to). This paper presents a survey exploring and analyzing the use and availability of social media during the Great San Diego/Southwest Blackout event.
INTRODUCTION
To mitigate the unpredictability of crises and the complexity of crisis response affected individuals and first responders are using new technologies, particularly social media, to help organize and coordinate crisis response. Examples include:
• Concerned citizens used a wiki after Hurricane Katrina to organize, collaborate, and rapidly create the PeopleFinder and ShelterFinder systems (Murphy & Jennex, 2006 ).
• Citizens affected by the 2007 San Diego
Wildfires used a wiki to pool knowledge on which homes burned and which survived when the local media failed to support their needs (Jennex, 2010) . • Mumbai citizens used twitter to report their status, let others know where to find friends, relatives, etc., and to solicit blood donations following the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks (Beaumont, 2008) . • Victims trapped by falling debris during the 2010 Haiti earthquake used texting and/ or Facebook to alert their friends/family to their location and condition (Boodhoo, 2010) .
These anecdotes provide evidence of the value of social media to individuals in responding to crisis. However, on September 8, 2011 a wide spread blackout struck southern Cali-fornia, including San Diego, and parts of Baja, Mexico. San Diego State University was closed as a result in the late afternoon with students and faculty released to rush hour congested freeways. During the drive home the author was contacted by local news stations for comment. This proved very difficult as cell reception faded in and out. Since this was not normal for this region it caused the author to wonder if the blackout was affecting cell availability. This led to contemplation on if other social media were experiencing availability (note that this paper defines availability as something that is usable upon demand) issues and ultimately to wondering if the blackout was an opportunity to explore social media availability and use during a large scale crisis. This paper reports on an exploratory study conducted on the availability of social media during the blackout and to help answer the question, is social media currently a viable option for crisis response during a large scale disaster. (Note that there is no Federal or Universal scale for classifying emergencies, for this paper a large scale emergency and disaster is one that affects all or nearly all residents in a large geographical area. San Diego County, according to Wikipedia (2012) has a population of over 3 million people, encompasses an area of over 4500 square miles (over 11,700 square kilometers, has over 70 miles of coastline, 16 military bases, 4 major universities, a nuclear power generation facility, and widespread industries such as communication, biotechnology, healthcare, and information technology). Plotnick and White (2010) describe social media as generally being attributed to the collaborative applications supported by Web 2.0 technologies. These include, but are not limited to, Twitter, Facebook, My Space, wikis, and blogs. Blogs, wikis, and My Space were the first applications becoming popular in the early 2000s while Facebook and Twitter are more recent creations. Cloud computing infrastructure is making social media applications more resilient and available; however, the methods users utilize to interact with social media applications are not. Most users access social media applications using their laptops, home computers, or mobile/smart telephones. Cloud computing infrastructure can be supported by self contained back up power supplies to ensure they remain operational should grid power be lost. Home connections rely on grid power to run their computers. Should that power fail, batteries are usually available for laptops and some users have uninterruptible power supplies (UPS) for their desk tops. In both cases broadband users rely on their modems/routers to connect to their Internet Service Provider (ISP) and these modems/routers may not be connected to a UPS. Mobile connections rely on the cell phone infrastructure to connect to the Internet. The cell phone infrastructure relies on a series of cell towers to connect mobile phones to the telephony system. Back up batteries are included in cell phone towers should grid power be lost. Ultimately, social media application availability is not just reliant on having a resilient platform on which to run. Availability is also dependent upon having a resilient and usable upon demand connection system (cell phone infrastructure, landline infrastructure, cable infrastructure) and interface system (mobile, laptop, desktop) . The availability issue then becomes that of being a complex system of inter-reliabilities between multiple systems owned and operated by different, and sometimes, competing, companies.
SOCIAL MEDIA

THE GREAT SOUTHWEST/ SAN DIEGO BLACKOUT
The Great Southwest/San Diego Blackout began at 3:38 PM on Thursday, September 8 2011 when a maintenance worker in Yuma, Arizona performing maintenance on a 500 kv (kilovolt) transmission line caused that line to trip, stopping power flow to San Diego. The line was restored to operational status within several minutes but during that period of inoperability instabilities in the grid caused a power generator in Mexico to trip offline. The loss of the Mexican power generator caused further instabilities in the grid resulting in a low voltage situation that caused the San Onofre transmission substation and nuclear plant to trip offline. The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station trip reduced available power while the trip of the transmission substation isolated the grid between San Diego and Los Angeles. The San Onofre transmission substation trip prevented the spread of the instabilities to Los Angeles and Orange County but also resulted in their being insufficient power for San Diego with the result that the San Diego/Southwest power grid collapsed and the region went into a blackout condition (CNN, 2011; Lee, 2011) .
The blackout lasted approximately 15 hours affecting approximately 5 million people, 1.4 million of them in San Diego (Lee, 2011; Page & Grieco, 2011) . However, while the blackout was of relatively short duration, there were many significant problems. First, the blackout occurred at the start of evening rush hour and caused the failure of the traffic signaling system (virtually all traffic lights defaulted to blinking four way stops). This caused huge traffic congestion throughout San Diego with a dramatic increase in commute times (the author's commute time went from 40 minutes to 2 hours, a fairly common example). Additionally, the trolley system failed with all trolleys stopped where they were at the time of the blackout as well as all train signaling systems failed causing non-electrical trains to have to reduce speed drastically. Finally, airports were forced to suspend operations due to reduced communication and control systems. Second, elevators, escalators, automatic doors, etc. in all buildings without backup power failed stranding a large number of people between floors or in stalled elevators. Third, water and water treatment equipment failed allowing some backflow and causing many residents to have to boil water before using it for humans. Fourth, refrigerators, freezers, stoves, televisions, and all home appliances without backup power failed. Among these failures were home computers and routers without UPS and laptops without charged batteries. Finally, and an additional motivation for this paper, the cell phone system experienced a great deal of degradation as observed by the author as he attempted to communicate with the local television stations to provide expert opinion on the causes and expected duration of the outage.
An early concern during the outage was that the blackout was the result of terrorist action. The concern was due to the failure of both main transmission lines into San Diego occurred at nearly the same time. The author and other power company authorities were quick to ally this fear once it was recognized that the San Onofre substation failed on low voltage (this was recognized to be the correct action for the substation given the known failures in the rest of the grid system). However, getting this information to the affected population proved to be difficult as cell phone communications were failing for the author as he moved from cell tower to cell tower, and for the authorities as cell phone circuits were overloaded. These cell tower failures occurring within several minutes to an hour following blackout initiation is another motivator for this paper.
Recovery from the blackout began as soon as the cause of the San Onofre substation trip was understood and the restoration of the Southwest Powerlink (the original failed transmission line). Restoration began with restart of power generators and then the expanding recovery of distribution loops radiating out from the recovered power generators. The power grid was restored within 15 hours of blackout initiation.
METHODOLOGY
This is an exploratory study that utilizes an exploratory survey to collect opinions and experiences related to the performance of social media during the Great San Diego/Southwest Blackout on September 8, 2011. The survey instrument was generated based on the research question of how available was social media during the Great San Diego/Southwest Blackout (items are presented in Tables presented throughout the paper); and was distributed within three days of the event. Survey Monkey was used to administer the survey and San Diego State University's Blackboard system was used to distribute a link to the survey to selected students at San Diego State University. Students were selected based on their having been students of the author. Responses were collected for two weeks with one follow up email sent. As this was an exploratory study with no theory or model testing attempted; survey results were analyzed using only descriptive statistics Students were selected as respondents as they are representative of the population expected to use social media, they were available, and they could be contacted rapidly. Rapid access was considered to be the primary requirement as it was important to collect survey responses while the event was still fresh in the memories of those solicited. Approximately 500 students were solicited. The exact number is not known due to the open invitation to pass the link on to acquaintances and family members as well as there being an issue with cross posting due to students taking multiple classes with the author. A total of 370 responses were received. All responses were used although some respondents did not answer all the items. To protect the identity of the respondents no personal identifiable information was collected. This eliminates potential follow up but was considered important for guaranteeing anonymity. The following reflects the demographics of the respondents.
Respondents were nearly evenly split on gender with 184 (49.9%) being male and 185 (50.1%) being female (of those reporting gender, 3 respondents did not report gender). As expected, the majority of respondents were mid twenties (since they were predominately graduate level students) although given the great diversity of the San Diego State University student body and a request to pass the survey link on to family and friends, there was a spread of ages as reflected in Table 1 .
The respondents also reflect a diversity of social relationships in the San Diego area (the largest population area affected by the blackout) as reflected in Table 2 This data was collected as it was felt that the larger the local social network of the respondent the more likely the respondent was to utilize social media to contact/coordinate actions during the blackout. As can be seen in Table 2 , over two thirds of the respondents had some family social network in San Diego. Table 3 shows the numbers of respondents who use various social media tools. Table 3 shows that large numbers of the respondents routinely use cell phones, text messaging, Facebook, and the Internet. Combined with the family social networks of the respondents it was expected that these respondents would be representative of those affected persons in the San Diego area that would use social media to contact and coordinate during the blackout crisis.
Burbary (2011) Burbary, 2011 , and Smith, 2011 , are reporting 2011 Since the respondents using Facebook are actually a higher percentage than the reported statistics (probably due to the statistics being reported early in 2011 while the blackout was in September of 2011) and is in line with the reported Twitter statistics it is concluded that the respondents are representative of those that should have knowledge of the performance and availability of social media during the blackout and are thus a representative sample of those possessing that knowledge. Additionally, the sample size of approximately 370 is considered sufficient to analyze and come to conclusions on the performance and availability of social media during the blackout crisis. Table 5 reflects the observed availability of the social media services used. It should be noted that over 70% of respondents for every social media tool reported loss or degradation of service. This is backed up by Table 6 that shows that approximately 60% of the respondents attempted to use social media at least hourly to every few minutes. This reflects the author's observation of frequent messages of "all circuits are busy" to "service unavailable" messages received during the crisis and possibly reflects an expected saturation of capacity condition as the affected population attempted to contact and coordinate with their social networks. It can also be indicative of cell towers failing during the blackout. Ultimately Table 7 is somewhat surprising in that it shows that over 95% of the respondents only attempted to communicate with 10 or fewer individuals. It is postulated that this smaller number of contacts reflects the focus on contacting/communicating with family and/or close personal friends rather than reaching out to all acquaintances (note that this is also consistent with Table 2 ). On reflection this is not an unexpected observation or result. Table 5 through to Table 7 taken together show that the respondents attempted to use social media and their cell phones relatively frequently to try to con-tact family and friends. This is consistent with research expectations and anecdotal evidence which suggests that in a crisis, victims and responders will attempt to use the tools they are familiar with to communicate. Table 8 reflects observed loss of service during the blackout. It is interesting to note that television virtually disappeared and that Internet connectivity and land line based phone service were severely impacted. It is promising that while cell phone service was degraded, over 75% respondents had at least some cell phone service. This reflects that cell phones may be safe to count on in the initial stages of a crisis. However, it is expected that had the blackout lasted more than a day then virtually all local cell phone service would have been lost. Table 9 shows that over 80% of the respondents were less than satisfied with the cell phone and Internet coverage available during the blackout. This indicates that there is an expectation that there would be better service, even during a power blackout.
RESULTS
The survey also asked respondents if they had anything to add through an open ended invitation. As these comments were not made in response to a planned item it is difficult to analyze them other than by grouping them by topic and using them for further insight into the results. As this is an exploratory study this is considered acceptable and even desirable as it provides more potential insight into what respondents are thinking. A total of 117 comments were made out of 370 respondents yielding a 31.6% comment rate. Since the comments were asked in the form if they had anything to add, a 31.6% made comments is indicative of how impactful the Great San Diego/Southwest Blackout was on the respondents. Table 10 summarizes the numbers of comments on various technologies. As some comments addressed multiple issues, the number of comments reported does not add up to 117.
Insights from the comments are provided. The comments have been edited to remove personal and company names, private references, and unrelated issues (issues such as how much partying was done, etc.). No attempt has been made to alter the meaning of any comment.
• Cell service was sporadic most of the evening. At times I was not able to make or receive calls, but I kept trying and it would come back enough to make calls to my children. • My phone went in and out of service, sometimes I would get a bar or 2 and was only able to make one successful phone call. However, my texting worked sporadically. I would get a bunch at once and then not get/or send any for a while. • I was surprised that i was able to use my cell phone during the blackout. it was the only communication device that still worked. • My internet was completely out, and I do not have a smart phone. Luckily, I was able to call out to friends with smart phones, and my family out of state to see what was • When the blackout first happened, my text messages were working along with my twitter, but it took many attempts to call my Dad who has the same service. The longer into the black out, the harder it was to use twitter and then texting… • I don't tweet.
• Facebook was amazing to have during the blackout. • I don't use social media like Facebook, however after the blackout and tsunami in Japan I have thought about creating an account in order to keep contact with relatives overseas and locally. • It was fun:) ... It's sad how distracted we can get, and how it takes something as big as a blackout to force us to just stop and appreciate those around us. It was nice to just have some good conversation, rather than constantly watching tv or being on the computer. • Showed my dependence on internet technologies. Felt I was disconnected. I was looking for news and all we had was our car radio. • We completely lost communication, we were not aware of what was going on. We had to go to the car to listen to the radio. • I don't have a smart phone so it was like I was living in the dark ages with no available wifi. • All the updates I received were over my car stereo because of the blackout no electronics in my house worked and cell phone service was highly degraded. • It freaked me out. A few minutes before sirens started going off at SDSU (around 5pm) I went to CNN.COM using my iPhone to try and see what was going on and the lead headline was "Breaking News: Officials warn of credible, but unconfirmed, terrorist threat" and all there was a headline, no story, then the phone stopped working, so I had no idea what this breaking news terrorist threat was or where it was then sirens started going off everywhere.
Most respondents focused on either their cell/smart phone service/experience or on their experience. However, several commented on social media including its availability and usefulness. Some common themes that were seen are that respondents ultimately ended up using their car or battery operated radios to keep informed. Also, many were surprised at the lack of service and at how unprepared San Diego seemed to be for a crisis of this nature. Finally, many commented on how nice it was not to technology for a while. While not the purpose of this paper, it is worth noting that a short duration blackout (about 12 hours) was actually considered kind of fun.
DISCUSSION
Is San Diego representative of modern cities and is its experience with social media performance and availability following a blackout potentially applicable to other cities? San Diego is the 14th most wired city in the United States (Forbes, 2010) while the United States is ranked 7th (OECD, 2011) in wireless users and 15th in broadband users (IT-Hall, 2011) . This doesn't make San Diego a leading city for being wired, but it is in the top tier of wired cities. This has a couple of implications. The first is that for other wired cities the San Diego experience is applicable and perhaps a harbinger that reliance on social media for crisis response following a major disaster that severely disrupts power distribution will not be successful. The second is that for those cities much less wired than San Diego and thus more reliant on traditional media such as television and land lines the situation following a disaster that severely disrupts power distribution may be even worse given the very poor performance of these media/services in San Diego. It is determined to be a fair assumption that San Diego is a representative city and that the Great San Diego/Southwest Blackout is representative of what may occur during blackouts in the developed world.
What does this all mean? It is clear that access to Internet sites was hampered. Home users virtually had no Internet so any Internet based communication via social media on the web would have failed. Additionally, any Internet based crisis response systems that can be accessed by home users would have been unavailable to those reliant on home based connections. However, over 65% of respondents access the Internet via their cell phones and almost 90% use text messaging. This implies that a large number of respondents could have been able to access the Internet and use social media as well as use texting social media. Given that almost 70% of respondents attempted to contact someone within a few minutes to an hour of the blackout starting it is fairly safe to say there were many attempts to use social media to update status (about 35% tried Facebook, 11% Twitter, and 90% text messaging). The observation is that users expected to use their social media and mobile during a crisis. It is interesting that users did not expect a blackout to affect their cell phones or social media. Given that cell tower infrastructure uses battery backups it is interesting and unexpected that there was so much cell phone degradation (77% reported less than usual signal strength, 83% reported lost coverage or degraded service). Circuits being busy are expected, but that several hundred cell towers failed was unexpected. It is suspected that batteries failed to perform as designed and this is troubling from a crisis response viewpoint as it would be expected that cell phone service should be fully available (as long as the cell phone tower infrastructure is physically intact) for 8 hours (per FCC order and as confirmed by FCC order 07-177 based on a review of communication failures following Hurricane Katrina where 1477 cell towers failed, Townsend, 2006 ) (Note that this rule also requires that phone switches and routers have 24 to 48 hour backup power supplies with additional fuel for generators on site with the equipment) (compliance with the FCC orders was to be within 12 months of the date of the orders; approximately October, 2008). The implication is that perhaps the cell phone system is much more complex than expected and that battery backups are not all that are needed to ensure system operability following loss of grid power. Another possibility is that cell phone tower back up battery maintenance and testing is not sufficient, much like what was found during Y2K approximately 12 years prior (Jennex, 2004) . That backup batter maintenance and testing is not sufficient is a very troubling but somewhat expected possibility as these programs tend to suffer during tough economic times as experienced world wide the last few years.
In summary, users expected to be able to use their cell phones for Internet and social media access during the Great San Diego/Southwest blackout. However, most were unsuccessful or had limited success. That there was an expectation of available service is a reasonable expectation. Federal Communication Commission rules had specified, based on an analysis of Hurricane Katrina, that all cell phone towers be equipped with an 8 hour battery backup and that other phone system equipment be equipped with 24-48 hour backup power systems with available fuel supply. Crisis response planners also expect cell phones and perhaps social media to be available following a loss of power grid event. However, this did not happen as well as expected during the Great San Diego/ Southwest Blackout.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately the Great Southwest Blackout can be considered a massive, unplanned, backup battery test. Did cell phones and social media pass the test? This is somewhat debatable. On one hand 83.4% of respondents lost or had their cell phone service degraded, 93.4% had their Internet service lost or degraded, and 60.5% were not satisfied with their level of service or coverage following the blackout. On the other hand 78.5% of respondents had some degree of cell phone service, 35.5% had some degree of Internet service, and 32.5% were satisfied with level of service or coverage. While many may consider it surprising so many respondents had some service during a blackout; if we judge these results from a crisis response lens the blackout test is failed. The duration of the blackout was less than 24 hours. It is proposed that for a service to be considered for crisis response support it should be resilient and rugged enough to survive and be available for a sufficient period of time to allow for utility/maintenance first responders to either preserve the system or implement backup systems. Less than 24 hours is not sufficient to ensure all cell towers, Internet access points, routers, and switches are in service. Backup power supplies should provide the time for this to occur and FCC rules require it. However, it does not appear that backup power supplies worked as completely as anticipated resulting in the widespread system/service outages. This appears to be a recurring issue. Jennex (2004) reported that backup power systems, including battery backups were reviewed as part of the overall contingency plan should Y2K issues cause failures in the power and communication and control systems. It was observed that battery testing and replacement intervals were often not met prior to Y2K resulting in increased awareness and commitment to perform critical battery testing and maintenance. Townsend (2006) and the FCC conducted reviews of communication system backup power supplies following Hurricane Katrina and both concluded that there was a failure of these backup systems which resulted in the issuance of FCC rules to improve backup system performance. These two events reflect the observed behavior of many organizations who vow to be prepared for the next crisis just after the current crisis ends but then have their enthusiasm and commitment wane as time passes and the "next" crisis does not occur. This may be what has occurred with backup battery testing and maintenance as good intentions did not result in all phone service providers having their backup power systems ready for the Great San Diego/Southwest Blackout. The recommendation is that government and industry experts evaluate cell phone battery backup maintenance and test procedures for improvement. Additionally, once cell phone systems availability can be reasonably considered resilient, social media source sites should be evaluated for inclusion in crisis response management planning and if found to be useful, propose and publish design guidelines that will make social media systems available and rugged enough to qualify as crisis response systems (i.e., propose similar rules for battery/power supply backup, etc. as is currently in force for the cell phone system).
Additionally, social media providers generally did not expect that their services would be used for crisis response. Facebook, Twitter, wikis, etc. were designed to be used to create communities, communicate with friends, and collaborate. The companies that created them did not design them to be available in crisis situations. This creates a problem for crisis response managers. Users will use the systems they are familiar with and use every day during a crisis (as evidenced by this study). It is only natural that users will use their social media first. The United States Emergency Broadcasting System does not include social media nor does most government managed crisis response plans, however, given the widespread unavailability of television and to some degree radio following the loss of the power grid, they should assess the viability of including social media as part of emergency broadcasting. Jennex (2010) noted that individuals have led the way in applying social media to crisis response and proposed that organizations use a knowledge management strategy approach to incorporate social media into their crisis response planning. Howe, Jennex, Bressler, and Frost (2011) discuss how self organizing groups are using social media to plan and prepare for large scale crises. The issue is users using innovative systems to do innovative things that the system designers never intended. The conclusion is that a discussion needs to occur between the crisis response community and the social media companies as to what is being done with social media in the field and what changes/enhancements are necessary to make social media useful for crisis response. Included in this discussion should be infrastructure concerns including how to harden and improve the availability during large scale crises of social media.
The research question for this paper is social media currently viable for crisis response. The conclusion of previous papers is that functionally the answer is yes, social media provide communication functionality that users want in crisis response (Plotnick & White, 2010; Jennex, 2010; Howe, Jennex, Bressler, & Frost, 2011) . However, the conclusion of this paper is that while the functionality of social media is useful, the maturity of social media from an availability point of view is not sufficient to warrant including social media as operational crisis response systems for large scale disasters at this time. Social media are fine for crisis response for emergencies that do not involve a blackout or widespread loss of power as well as for crisis response planning, but not for large scale disaster operational crisis response and it will take some thoughtful redesign of social media infrastructure before they are acceptable for large scale disaster operational crisis response.
IMPLICATIONS
This research has implications for both academia and practice. The findings provide a research agenda for academics working in the areas of communication and crisis response network design with respect to the design of highly available systems. The findings also serve as a reminder to social media practitioners that these tools will be used in crises and in ways not anticipated. Finally, academics and practitioners working in crisis response need to plan on using social media in crisis response.
